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Abstract
Integrative and distributive negotiation strategies are a key paradigm of practice, teaching, and research.
Are these US-formulated negotiation prototypes valid in the rest of the world? Adopting a cross-cultural
view, we analyze a sample of 214 foreigners who detailed the negotiation behavior they faced in Italy (134)
and in the United States (80). Implementing latent class analysis, we identify three clusters of negotiation
prototypes. Our findings show how the Country is a predictor for cluster membership, and peculiar cul-
tural traits of the two groups contribute to explain the differences in negotiation strategies. Three proto-
types emerged: a typically distributive, an emotional integrative (mostly Italian), and an impersonal
integrative (mostly American). Results show how the handling of emotions is a crucial part of the inter-
action for Italian negotiators, regardless of their orientation toward negotiation strategies, implying a cul-
tural influence toward handling emotions in negotiations.
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Introduction
The ability to negotiate internationally and across cultures has become vital for businesses
(Caputo, Ayoko, Amoo, & Menke, 2019a; Ogliastri & Quintanilla, 2016). However, cross-cultural
negotiation entails communication difficulties and challenges (Imai & Gelfand, 2010; Liu, Chua,
& Stahl, 2010; Ramirez Marin, Olekalns, & Adair, 2019), and seems to result in lower outcomes
(e.g., Brett, Gunia, & Teucher, 2017). The behavioral theory of negotiations (Walton & McKersie,
1965), which is the most widespread theoretical framework in negotiation (Cutcher-Gershenfeld
& Kochan, 2015), posits how fundamental to negotiation success is the choice between a distribu-
tive (or positional) and an integrative (or principled) negotiation strategy (Patton, 2015). These
two prototypes were originally developed in the United States and have been extensively assumed
to hold their importance universally (Gelfand & Brett, 2004). Cross-cultural studies in negotiation
have been flourishing during the last few decades, especially research focusing on the effects of
social, political, and cultural contexts on the negotiation process, strategies, and outcomes. Yet,
most research on intercultural negotiations continues to tend to compare distant cultures, such
as eastern versus western (e.g., Adler & Graham, 2017; Zhang, Oetzel, Ting-Toomey, & Zhang,
2019), whereas a minority analyzes cross-cultural interactions among similar ones, such as
westerners.
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In contrast, we ask to what extent the prototypes of integrative and distributive negotiators use-
fully represent intercultural negotiation behavior in two western cultures, the USA and Italy. Italy,
in particular, has been largely neglected in studies of cross-cultural negotiation despite its economic
importance. Consequently, this study aims to contribute to fill a gap in the literature by answering
the following research questions: are the behavioral theory of negotiations’ prototypes (distributive-
positional vs. integrative-principles), developed in the United States, generalizable to other western
cultures of the world? And, what are the patterns of negotiation in Italy and the perception of
foreigners who live and work there? By answering these questions, we would be contributing to
the call by Brett, Gunia, and Teucher (2017) for more investigation of anomalies in extant research
that could be explained by studying the cultural relevance of negotiation theory and consideration
of new constructs for a truly global understanding of negotiations.
Our study focuses on behaviors that people from different national cultures demonstrate dur-
ing negotiation processes, as reported by counterparts who have been negotiating with them. We
use a sample of 214 reports on American and Italian negotiators to identify clusters of negotiation
prototypes. Employing latent class analysis (LCA) (Collins & Lanza, 2010), we aim to determine
whether belonging to a specific country culture affects the probability of belonging to one of the
negotiator clusters. To study the cultural relevance of the behavioral theory of negotiations
(Walton & McKersie, 1965), we use eight questions directly related to the principles of negoti-
ation suggested by Fisher, Ury, and Patton (1981). They propose a framework to help achieving
a ‘good agreement’ and avoid getting stuck in a positional bargaining. In particular, they highlight
that integrative agreements are the result of four negotiation principles. First of all, negotiators
should separate the people from the issue to maintain the relationship, by understanding the
other parties’ interpretations and perceptions, an adequate handling of emotions, and effective
communication and active listening. Second, the negotiating parties should focus on interests
at stake, rather than their positions. Third, it is fundamental to generate creative options to
solve the problem, from an inventive and unconstrained brainstorming initial process to a
clear evaluation and refinement of promising proposals to negotiate on. Finally, the authors sug-
gest agreeing upon and using objective criteria to resolve differences during the negotiation pro-
cess. The framework and principles proposed by Fisher, Ury, and Patton (1981) are extremely
popular and still extensively used by both practitioners and scholars, and linked to the distribu-
tive/integrative models (Patton, 2015); therefore, we apply our variable selection based on this
theoretical construct.
The analysis leads to the identification of three negotiation prototypes and country culture is a
significant predictor of clusters’ membership. Most North American negotiators adopt an inte-
grative strategy, using objectivity, technical criteria, and avoiding haggling, even though they
are impersonal and less oriented to explore the interests of the counterpart (‘impersonal integra-
tive’). Italian negotiators are fairly equally spread between a distributive and an integrative nego-
tiation prototype. The distributive one is the classical type, who conceives the negotiation as a
zero–sum game and undertakes a bargaining process. The other one shows some of the typical
traits of the integrative negotiation strategy, being oriented to explore interests and to create
mutual value within a colleagueship process but is also expressing and dealing with emotions dur-
ing the negotiation, a controversial subject of research and practice. This original ‘emotional inte-
grative’ prototype of negotiators that we find for Italy represents one of the most interesting
contribution of implementing an LCA in this context.
Theoretical background
Integrative versus distributive negotiations
Negotiations occur in situations where two or more parties with conflicting interests jointly seek a
mutual agreement to reconcile their differences, rather than resorting to force or trial (e.g., Lax &
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Sebenius, 1986). Over the years, as scholars have built a broad body of theoretical and empirical
literature on negotiation – which embraces the development and validation of models and tech-
niques for making agreements – they have defined two predominant negotiation prototypes: dis-
tributive and integrative negotiation model strategies (Cutcher-Gershenfeld & Kochan, 2015;
Fisher, Ury, & Patton, 1981; Patton, 2015; Walton & McKersie, 1965).
The distributive (or positional) negotiation strategy treats the negotiation process as positional
bargaining, in which each party tries to maximize its share of payoffs, which are perceived as a
fixed sum (Patton, 2015; Pruitt & Rubin, 1986). Accordingly, negotiators assume they must
distribute a fixed value, so one party will lose and the other will win (the so-called win–lose,
zero–sum, or fixed–pie configuration). This focus on distributing value implies inefficiencies, dis-
torts the negotiation relationship, and complicates creating value in the negotiation (Brett &
Thompson, 2016).
In the integrative (or principled) negotiation strategy, parties explore options to increase the
size of the joint gain, before focusing on the division of payoffs (Patton, 2015; Pruitt & Rubin,
1986). This tends to solve problems jointly and to benefit all parties, as negotiators distribute
the increased value by applying objective criteria (rather than haggling, as in distributive negoti-
ation) (Fisher et al., 1981). Integrative negotiation is claimed to be superior to distributive nego-
tiation because it gradually yields a more efficient and longer term agreement, to the benefit of all
parties (Brett & Thompson, 2016).
Negotiation in cross-cultural contexts
The behavioral theory of negotiations was initially developed in the context of North American
labor negotiations and business agreements (Walton & McKersie, 1965), and since then a vast
research effort has been stimulated to expand the understanding of international negotiations
involving individuals from different cultures. The main, common question that has been driving
this research stream is whether distributive versus integrative behaviors in cross-cultural negotia-
tions differ in important ways from those in intracultural negotiations (Adair & Brett, 2005).
Although the theoretical models seem generally valid across cultures (Graham, Mintu, &
Rodgers, 1994), numerous studies confirm that there are some substantial differences among cul-
tural groups (Caputo, Marzi, Maley, & Silic, 2019b; Ma, Lee, & Yu, 2008). Culture profoundly
affects how people think, communicate, and behave, including the types of agreements they
make and the way they reach them (Brett, 2007, 2017; Salacuse, 1999). A particularly prolific
stream of research has compared negotiation processes exhibited by individuals from different
countries, mainly using the United States as a benchmark and trying to explain any substantial
deviation from the reference models in terms of different cultural qualities and idiosyncrasies
(e.g., Adair & Brett, 2005; Adair, Okumura, & Brett, 2001; Cai & Fink, 2002; Gunia, Brett, &
Gelfand, 2016; Morris & Gelfand, 2004).
Most of these studies have used Hofstede’s (2011) five-dimensional model of national cultures,
the dimensions being power distance, uncertainty avoidance, individualism/collectivism, mascu-
linity/femininity, and long-/short-term orientation (Adair & Brett, 2005; Adair, Hideg, & Spence,
2013; Kirkman, Lowe, & Gibson, 2006; Vieregge & Quick, 2011). For example, individualistic cul-
tures may be expected to be more self-centered and focused on personal gains (Brett & Okumura,
1998), whereas negotiators from a collectivist culture concentrate more on forming a relationship
and discriminate between in-group and out-group partners, feeling strongly linked to the former
and promoting their collective interests and goals during the negotiation process, an approach
that can lead to higher joint profits (Cai, Wilson, & Drake, 2000). Caputo and colleagues (2018,
2019a) found that power distance and masculinity increase the preference for a distributive strategy,
whereas uncertainty avoidance and collectivism increase the preference for an integrative one.
However, some scholars argue that Hofstede’s original sample fails to capture how culture
evolved over time and neglects within-country cultural differences (e.g., Kirkman, Lowe, &
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Gibson, 2006). The Globe study (House, Hanges, Javidan, Dorfman, & Gupta, 2004) adds cultural
dimensions and points to differences between culture ‘as it is now’ and ‘as it should be.’ Hall
(1976) identifies two important cultural characteristics: monochronic/polychronic time and com-
munication context. Polychronicity is necessary to create value by package negotiations rather
than issue by issue. The implicit communication context can be high or low. Negotiators from
low-context communication cultures favor direct information sharing, whereas those from high-
context communication cultures assume that some meanings and nuances must be inferred
(Adair et al., 2004).
A recent stream of research focuses on the distinction among dignity, honor, and face cultures
(Aslani et al., 2016; Brett & Thompson, 2016; Leung & Cohen, 2011). Other studies have high-
lighted other aspects that can impact the outcomes of negotiation, including emotions (Gelfand &
Brett, 2004; Ogliastri & Quintanilla, 2016; Schlegel, Mehu, van Peer, & Scherer, 2018), consensus
building and trust (Brett, Gunia, & Teucher, 2017; Liu, Friedman, Barry, Gelfand, & Zhang, 2012;
Yao, Zhang, & Brett, 2017), cognitive biases (Caputo, 2013, 2016; Morris & Gelfand, 2004), and
cultural intelligence (Caputo, Ayoko, & Amoo, 2018; Caputo et al., 2019a; Groves, Feyerherm, &
Gu, 2015; Imai & Gelfand, 2010).
Cultural differences among international negotiators can represent a serious obstacle to effect-
ive negotiation (Adler & Aycan, 2018; Graham, Mintu, & Rodgers, 1994; Salacuse, 1999), as they
potentially affect the role of the negotiators, the nature of communication, mutual perceptions,
preferences, and the negotiation style itself, finally determining the outcome and form of the
agreement (Cai, Wilson, & Drake, 2000; Gelfand & Brett, 2004; Gelfand, Brett, Gunia, Imai,
Huang, & Hsu, 2013; Usunier, 2018). Nevertheless, negotiators from different cultures will not
always clash and reach suboptimal agreements; indeed, differences may offer opportunities.
Adler (1980), who refers to this as the ‘culturally synergistic’ approach, claims that international
negotiators can generate mutually beneficial options by identifying interests that different parties
value differently. In other words, in cross-cultural negotiations, the process complexity increases,
but the opportunities of reaching an agreement with joint gains also improve when negotiators
recognize their fundamental compatibilities instead of focusing on stereotypes.
In sum, there is still a need to clarify how distinctive cultural traits affect negotiation processes
and outcomes: to move from qualitative descriptions and manuals of ‘dos and don’ts’ toward a
more comprehensive and profound examination of the influence of culture on negotiators’ tactics,
outcomes, motives, and cognitions, along with a deeper understanding of the broad effects of
intercultural interaction (Adler & Aycan, 2018). To this end, we formulate two main propositions
for research:
Proposition 1: The integrative and distributive negotiation prototypes should be valid in both
Italy and the USA.
Proposition 2: The negotiation prototypes in Italy and the USA should differ.
We aim to determine whether the distributive and integrative negotiator prototypes can be vali-
dated within two distinct Western cultural clusters: the Latin European and the Anglo (see, e.g.,
House et al., 2004). Indeed, the characterization of Italy and the United States along the cultural
dimensions proposed by Hofstede (2001) suggests that although they share some cultural traits
(e.g., they are both classified in middle-to-low positions for power distance and relatively high
for masculinity), the North American country exhibits the highest position on individualism
and Italy presents stronger traits in terms of uncertainty avoidance and long-term orientation.1
These divergencies can have a significant effect on negotiation strategies. With our analysis, we
1Appendix 1 reports the Hofstede’s cultural indices for Italy and the United States (https://geerthofstede.com/research-
and-vsm/dimension-data-matrix/).
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also contribute to the study of Italy, a major world economic player,2 which is rarely mentioned
in studies on cross-cultural negotiations.
Methods
Research design and data collection
We sought a method that would allow us to investigate real negotiations and isolate focal con-
structs, and would not be influenced by previous respondent behaviors (Caputo, 2016;
Ogliastri & Quintanilla, 2016). We therefore adopted a mixed methods approach (Hesse-Biber,
2010), triangulating the results of LCA (Collins & Lanza, 2010) with the testimonies about experi-
ences of direct negotiations in different business contexts (Ogliastri & Quintanilla, 2016).
We adopted a previously validated questionnaire made of 20 open-ended questions3 (see, for
further explanation, Ogliastri & Quintanilla, 2016). The answers were coded into 53 categorical
variables in order to make the data easily intelligible in mostly Yes/No/Don’t know answers.
An example of the codebook is presented in Appendix 3. This is a quantitative data set, with
face validity and conveniently structured for statistical analysis. We gathered the data within
the framework of theory of practice (Bourdieu, 1977), using experiences to develop theory
(Broome, 2017) and integrating teaching, practice, theory, and research (Ebner & Parlamis,
2017). To reduce the risk that results might be biased by specific contextual events, data were col-
lected between 2010 and 2018. Our database consists of thorough records of intercultural nego-
tiation experiences and includes 214 observations, from foreign experienced managers, about
American (N = 80) and about Italian (N = 134) negotiators.
Lewicki, Saunders, and Barry (2020) report how one of the main limitations of the vast body of
research in negotiation consist of result being drawn from laboratory experimental design rather
than accounts of real negotiations. Therefore, answering to this call for a closer to reality approach
in negotiation research, we employed a convenience sampling technique gathering data from
interviews with experienced managers. The interviews were carried out by international students
in an MBA negotiation course as part of their assignment. To avoid the risks associated with self-
reported measures, each MBA student conducted an interview with a foreign manager (i.e.,
expat), who reported the most common or normal behavior of his counterparts in the country
of origin of the student. By applying this method we reduced the interviewer biases present in
normal qualitative research, as a different interviewer was employed for each interviewee. In add-
ition, we limited the research bias as we, the researchers, were not directly involved in the inter-
view, therefore separating the cognitive processes of data collection, interpretation, and analysis.
Moreover, our method guaranteed that the accounts were provided by counterparts not sharing
the same cultural background, ensuring a better report of cross-cultural interactions. That meant
that the managers that explained their negotiation experiences in Italy (or in the USA) were from
different backgrounds and nationalities, helping to further reduce possible biased interpretations
of results.
We then developed a codebook, comprising 53 variables, to convert the qualitative informa-
tion from the interviews into quantitative data.4 To further limit the researcher bias, five graduate
research assistants were employed over 5 years with the task to code interviews, with an interrater
reliability coefficient (Fleiss’ kappa) of .65, implying ‘substantial agreement’ in the coding phase.
2For example, the Financial Times reported on March 22, 2016 that the value of cross-border merger and acquisition deals
in Italy reached a new high in 2015 at over $50bn; Italian companies were the most targeted by foreign acquisitions in the
European Union after the UK, along with French ones (https://www.ft.com/content/df73311e-0b35-3d5c-aaf9-e12e49f6eee3).
Caputo (2012, 2019) thoroughly analyzed the negotiation process of the Fiat-Chrysler deal, one of the most relevant negotia-
tions led by an Italian firm in the last decade.
3Appendix 2 reports the 20 questions of the survey.
4Appendix 3 reports a sample of the codebook used to convert the information collected during the interviews into the
categorical variables of our quantitative database.
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In addition, as a preliminary analysis showed interesting results about the Italian negotiators
that begged further analysis due to the lack of research about Italian negotiators, we complemen-
ted the study with 86 qualitative interviews based on a different questionnaire5 and focusing on
the specific negotiation experience of a foreigner with an Italian counterpart. In line with Nielsen
et al. (2020) recommendations, the responses were classified, and relevant quotations were used
to triangulate and deepen our theoretical understanding and interpretation of the quantitative
results.
Data analysis
The sample size of the quantitative database (214 observations and 53 variables) immediately
ruled out the possibility of using the whole set of variables to perform any statistical analysis.
Therefore, we initially needed to reduce the variables to a subset that we could use to identify
meaningful clusters of respondents. Basing our selection on theoretical grounds, we chose
eight variables that best described the four negotiation principles proposed by Fisher, Ury, and
Patton (1981): separate people from the problem, focus on interest (not positions), invent options
for mutual gain, and insist on objective criteria (see Table 1).
According to the theoretical framework developed by Fisher, Ury, and Patton (1981), the
negotiator that seeks integrative agreements while maintaining the relationship with the counter-
part should not treat the other party as rival, not let his/her emotions to dominate the process, try
to explore and understand the expectations of the other party, not focusing excessively on the first
proposal, but rather integrating mutual interests to reach a satisfactory agreement for both parties.
Moreover, they suggest that the negotiation process should be based on creating value first, and
then use objective considerations and technical criteria to distribute the value.
We then applied latent class analysis (hereafter LCA), a special case within the more general
class of latent variable models (Bartholomew, Knott, & Moustaki, 2011). The most distinctive fea-
ture of these models is that researchers cannot directly observe some of their variables, either
because the variables are difficult or impossible to measure, or simply because the researchers
did not measure them. These latent variables, nonetheless, form a critical part of the model
and strongly influence the behavior of individuals. Although this set of variables cannot be
observed, the researcher does have access to another set of observed, manifest variables that
potentially correlate with the latent variables (Goodman, 1974).
In LCA, the latent variable is categorical, comprising a set of latent classes with multinomial
distribution, which are measured by observed indicators. The overall objective of performing LCA
on a set of variables is to derive a batch of latent classes (or ‘clusters’) that represents the response
pattern in the data and gives a sense of the prevalence of each latent class (Collins & Lanza, 2010).
Following Collins and Lanza (2010), we assume the existence of a latent categorical variable g
that can take on G possible values:
g = {1, 2, . . . , G}.
These values themselves neither have a special meaning nor represent an ordinal scale; they are
just labels. In our case, they are associated with different negotiation behaviors.
We cannot observe g directly, but we have access to the manifest categorical variables j = 1, …,
J – (in our case, the answers to the questions in the survey about cross-cultural negotiation). Each
categorical variable j has kj = 1, …, Kj response categories.
6
5Appendix 4 reports the questions used to recompile the information of our qualitative database.
6The model can accommodate different numbers of possible responses for each variable. In our case, for most variables,
kj = 3, with j = {1, 2, 3} = {Yes, Do not know/Not sure, No}. However, a few variables have more possible responses. For
example, the variable Counterpart, which corresponds to the question ‘How do they treat the counterpart?,’ has six possible
responses: kCounterpart = {1, …, 6} = {Friend, Colleague, Rival, Impersonal, Other, Do not know/Not sure}.
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Table 1. Variable selection according to principles of negotiation (Fisher, Ury, & Patton, 1981)
Fisher–Ury–Patton



















Expectations Do they try to know and fulfill
the expectations of the
other party?
Yes (they explore the interests of the
other party)
Don’t know/Not sure
No (they concentrate just on their
own interests)
Bargain Is it essentially a bargaining
process based on the initial
proposal?
Yes (they insist on the original
proposal for a good while)
Don’t know/Not sure
No (they try to integrate mutual








No (only individual interests)











Objectivity Do they use objective criteria
to justify offers?




No (they use purely subjective
bargaining, haggling)
Technicians Are technicians involved in the
negotiation process?
Yes (technical criteria are key)
Don’t know/Not sure
No (little influence of technical staff
in negotiation)
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We define x = (k1, …, kj) as a complete response pattern, namely a vector of responses to the J
manifest categorical variables. Let xj represent element j of a response pattern x.
On the assumption that the manifest variables are mutually independent of each other, and
conditional on being a member of group g, the probability density of an observed response pat-










where 1(xj = kj) represents an indicator variable that equals 1 when the response to variable j is
the kj-th possible answer, and 0 otherwise. Pj,kj|g represents the probability that the categorical
variable takes on the kj-th value and acts as the probability for each possible response. The
index g explicitly refers to the fact that these probabilities differ among the latent classes.
One fundamental assumption of latent class models is the local independence assumption,
which implies, conditionally on the latent variables, that the observed variables are independent.7
This assumption makes LCA a relatively simple model to estimate. If membership in the different













where πg represents the probability of belonging to class g, the so-called mixing proportion from
cluster analysis.
Maximum likelihood (ML) estimates the parameters of the model based on the data and
results in two outputs:
• Latent class prevalences: The πg values represent the probabilities of membership in the dif-
ferent classes. They measure the importance or prevalence of the different clusters in the
population.8
• Item-response probabilities: The Pj,kj|g values are calculated for each group and for each ques-
tion in the survey and express the relation between each observed variable and each latent
class. They represent a vector of probabilities that measures the probability of a specific pat-
tern of answers to the different questions. The different responses allow for the different
classes to be profiled.9
All the formulas written above remain conditional on knowing the number of latent classes. In
practice, of course, the number of classes remains unknown in advance, and one must proceed by
fitting models with different numbers of classes, starting with a model with no cluster structure
whatsoever (a model in which the number of classes equals 1). Then the researcher must try more
complicated models, with two or more classes. The Bayesian information criterion (BIC) selects
the best model as a transformation (a penalized version) of the log-likelihood statistic and is gen-
erally the most appropriate goodness-of-fit criterion for basic latent class models (Collins &
7The local independence assumption does not imply that, in a data set, the observed variables are independent, as in fact it
is the relations among the observed variables that are explained by the latent classes. Independence is rather assumed to hold
only within each latent class (and therefore it is called ‘local’) (Collins & Lanza, 2010).
8The latent classes are mutually exclusive and exhaustive, which means that each individual is a member of one and only
one latent class. Therefore,
∑G
g=1 pg = 1.
9Because each individual provides one and only one response to variable j, the vector of item-response probabilities for a
particular variable conditional on a particular latent class g always sums to 1:
∑Kj
kj=1 Pj,kj |g = 1.
8 Sara Benetti et al.
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Lanza, 2010; Linzer & Lewis, 2011), as it allows picking a model that fits the data well, while
remaining parsimonious and protecting against overfitting the dataset:
BIC = −2× LL+ log (N)×M
where LL represents the log-likelihood statistic, M represents the number of parameters in the
model, and N represents the sample size. The best model is the one that achieves the smallest
BIC value.
As we are interested in whether country culture predicts membership in the latent classes, we
introduce a covariate Country = {1, 2} = {ITA, USA} into the latent class model. Covariates can be
incorporated into LCA using a logistic regression approach (Collins & Lanza, 2010). The frame-
work is the same as previously described. In addition, we introduce a covariate V, to be used to













where πg(v) is a standard baseline-category multinomial logistic model. In LCA with covariates,
the item-response probabilities are still estimated; latent class prevalences can be easily calculated
from the estimated parameters.10
Results
The first step of LCA is to define the optimal number of clusters. Table 2 reports the fit statistics
for this clustering process, comparing potential candidate models with one to four clusters. The
table reports likelihood statistics, BICs, numbers of parameters, and residual degrees of freedom.
In our case, the model with three classes has the smallest BIC value and therefore represents the
best description of the data.
Table 3 shows the results of estimating the LCA model with country as covariate (Linzer &
Lewis, 2011), which identify three distinct classes of negotiation prototypes.
Negotiators who fall under Class 1 (33.45% of observations) tend to practice distributive nego-
tiation: 55% of them consider the counterpart in negotiation as a rival, and they seem to concen-
trate only on their own interests, neither trying to understand and fulfill the expectations of the
other party (80%) nor including mutual interests in their first proposal (68%). In 81% of the
cases, they are perceived as understanding the process of negotiation as a distributive, zero–
sum game. On the other hand, negotiators who fit into Class 2 (29.59% of observations) and
Class 3 (36.96%) tend to practice integrative negotiation. They extensively use objective criteria
and technical considerations to justify their offers (80% for Class 2 and 90% for Class 3), and
their counterparts largely recognize that they understand negotiation as an interest-based process
to create and distribute value for mutual gains (76 and 54% for Classes 2 and 3, respectively).
Interestingly, although the overall frequencies of each class seem rather uniformly distributed,
as soon as we consider the effect of the variable Country, the picture changes significantly. An
Italian negotiator has a 51.17% probability of belonging to Class 1 and a 43.42% probability of
belonging to Class 2, whereas an American negotiator has an 89.81% probability of fitting into
Class 3. This pattern is mirrored when we consider each class separately: for Classes 1 and 2,
the probability of a member’s being Italian is above 90%, and for Class 3, the probability of a




g′ = 1, . . . , G− 1 (the logistic regression requires to choose one category of the criterion variable as the reference category
and generates an estimate of the effect for each latent class in comparison with the reference one).
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member’s being American is also around 90%. Clearly, the variable Country has a significant
impact on clustering, and the two cultural groups differ in negotiation styles and strategies.
On these grounds, we can reckon that Proposition 1 is partially supported by our data, as we
identify both the distributive and the integrative negotiation prototypes for Italy, but only the
integrative one for the USA – a finding that has precedents in the literature (e.g., Pruitt,
1981).11 The fact that both Classes 2 and 3 tend toward integrative negotiation but are separate
clusters with distinctly national membership patterns indicates that negotiation prototypes are
not completely homogeneous across different cultures, in accordance with Proposition 2.
It is important to notice here that, despite sharing a common history, religion, ancestry, and
language, Italy is not totally homogeneous, with differences in values, attitudes, and behaviors
between North and South (see, e.g., Clò, 2006). In his online platform, which allows users to com-
pare and contrast the cultural characteristics of countries, Hofstede recognizes this difference12
(in particular, on the dimensions of power distance and individualism), which makes
Northern Italy more similar to the USA. Our databases do not include information on the
regional origin of the Italian counterparts with whom our respondents negotiated, so we adopt
Hofstede’s general list of Italian cultural features. And indeed, both Classes 1 and 2 present intri-
guing idiosyncrasies that substantially differentiate them from the predominantly North
American Class 3.
First, negotiators of both Classes 1 and 2 are reported to express emotions during the nego-
tiation process (75 and 60%, respectively). Given that these two classes are mainly composed
of Italian individuals, this result suggests that emotionality is an embedded cultural characteristic
that persists in negotiation, whichever strategy is used. In their review of negotiation behaviors
linked to peculiar cultural traits, Hofstede et al. (2012) state that negotiators from uncertainty
avoiding cultures tend to have an emotional style of negotiation and it is important for them
to make sure that their counterpart understand and are aware of their feelings (Hofstede,
2001). The extensive expression of emotions during the negotiation process displayed by
Italians can be a reflection of their relatively high uncertainty avoidance culture (Italy ranks 28
out of 63 countries on this dimension of the Hofstede’s model, whereas the USA ranks 5213).
The topic of emotions is also often mentioned in our qualitative database. For instance, a
Colombian director of a legal office who has an Italian woman client in Bogotá commented
that ‘[Italians] are very expressive … they laugh or cry or scream when they feel it and express
everything they think and feel without fears’ (Interview 18). Emotions seem to have an ambigu-
ous impact on the negotiation process, as they can manifest sometimes as kindness and
Table 2. Model selection with 1, 2, 3, or 4 clusters
Model LL BIC Number of estimated parameters Residual degrees of freedom
1-Cluster −1,887.21 3,876.37 19 195
2-Cluster −1,701.44 3,612.15 39 175
3-Cluster −1,630.31 3,577.21a 59 155
4-Cluster −1,579.41 3,582.74 79 135
aThis is the preferred model according to the BIC criterion (lowest BIC).
11We tried to run LCA with four clusters to verify whether a cluster would emerge with distributive negotiation behavior
and a predominance of American individuals. However, what appeared was a third, prevalently Italian, negotiation prototype
that represents an ‘intermediate’ style between the integrative and the distributive ones, in the sense that, for most of the
questions, the counterpart could not clearly determine the dominant negotiation behavior (most answers fell in the ‘Do
not know/Not sure’ category). Results are available upon request.
12https://www.hofstede-insights.com/country-comparison/italy/.
13Data on positional rankings of Italy and USA on the Hofstede’s cultural dimensions are reported in Appendix 1.
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Table 3. Parameter estimates for 3-class model using Country as covariate
Principle Variable Question
No. of
levels Levels Class 1 Class 2 Class 3
Separate people
from problems
Counterpart How do they treat the counterpart? 6 Friend .18 .14 .16
Colleague .08 .58 .26
Rival .55a .06 .09
Impersonal .03 .00 .44
Other .00 .00 .03
Don’t know .16 .22 .02
Emotions Do they express emotions in
negotiations?
3 Yes (emotional) .75 .60 .19
Don’t know .23 .38 .01
No (rational) .02 .02 .80
Focus on interests Expectations Do they try to know and fulfill the
expectations of the other party?
3 Yes (they explore the interests of the other
party)
.07 .70 .48
Don’t know .14 .30 .10
No (they concentrate just on their own
interests)
.79 .00 .42
Bargain Is it essentially a bargaining process
based on the initial proposal?
3 Yes (they insist on the original proposal for
a good while)
.60 .37 .29
Don’t know .40 .24 .10
No (they try to integrate mutual interests,




Mutuality Does first proposal include mutual
interests?
3 Yes (mutual interests) .02 .50 .30
Don’t know .30 .46 .44
No (only individual interests) .68 .04 .26
Negotiation How do they understand the
process of negotiation?
3 Distribute value (distributive, traditional,
positional, zero–sum game)
.80 .07 .40
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levels Levels Class 1 Class 2 Class 3
Create and distribute value (integrative,




Technicians Are technicians involved in the
negotiation process?
3 Yes (technical criteria are key) .15 .13 .52
Don’t know .58 .48 .20
No (little influence of technical staff in
negotiation)
.27 .39 .23
Objectivity Do they use objective criteria to
justify offers?
3 Yes (they use data, technical
considerations, fact-based proposals)
.12 .80 .90
Don’t know .23 .17 .03
No (they use purely subjective bargaining,
haggling)
.65 .03 .07
Frequency of class .33 .3 .37
Pr (Class = g|Country = ITA) .51 .43 .06
Pr (Class = g|Country = USA) .04 .06 .90
Pr (Country = ITA|Class = g) .96 .92 .09
Pr (Country = USA|Class = g) .04 .08 .91
Maximum log-likelihood (LL) −1,567.38
BIC 3,462.09
Number of estimated parameters 61
Residual degrees of freedom 153
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friendship and sometimes as aggressiveness and lack of control. A Mexican interviewee reported,
‘[Italians] are very expressive, their gestural and body language is very evident; when they discuss,
the situation can turn tense due to the volume of their voice and the intention of the message …
Their intense emotions are culturally natural; their “openness” can degenerate into hostility but
also [can manifest] in an affectionate, sympathetic, or even “convincing” gesture’ (Interview 86).
This trait is commonly recognized by Italians themselves. An Italian owner of a restaurant in
Spain, for example, stated that ‘The Italians and Spaniards have a very similar character, we
are visceral, impulsive …’ (Interview 42).
In general, this type of emotional negotiator perceives negotiation meetings as an occasion for
social contact; participants tend to discuss generalities, and technicians seldom participate in the
process. In our data, for both Classes 1 and 2, negotiating counterparts seem unsure whether or
not technicians are involved in the negotiation process (58 and 48%, respectively).
It is also not very clear whether negotiators in Classes 1 and 2 essentially perceive the nego-
tiation as a bargaining process. On the one hand, in Class 1, 60% of individuals seem to base their
strategy on haggling, whereas in the rest of the cases it is hard for the counterpart to assess this
attitude. On the other hand, in Class 2, negotiators are almost equally distributed, with 37% of
them insisting on their initial proposal and showing a bargaining attitude, and 39% of them try-
ing to integrate mutual interests into the negotiation and pursuing the creation of shared value.
This lack of clarity is reflected also in our qualitative database. A Colombian sales manager stated
that ‘with them [Italians] there is not much bargaining possibility’ but also that Italians ‘are flex-
ible to the extent possible, friendly, open, and avoid conflict and problems’ (Interview 5). Another
Colombian interviewee, who oversaw sales coordination with Mediterranean Europe, commented
regarding negotiating with Italian counterparts: ‘Sometimes there was haggling, but in general
terms it was a very well-structured process, […]. Basically, intermediate points between the
two positions were achieved, [and] new clauses were drafted, taking the obligations of both parties
to logical points, seeking that the agreement and the cooperation of the companies really occurred
without damages to any of them’ (Interview 19). The apparent coexistence of distributive and
integrative strategies among Italian negotiators may explain this ambivalence. In contrast, the dir-
ect assessment of how the counterpart understands and handles the negotiation process differ-
entiates the two styles explicitly: 81% of individuals in Class 1 are perceived as distributive and
76% of those in Class 2 are recognized as integrative.
The North American cluster shows predominantly integrative attitudes, even if some of the
behaviors are distributive. In particular, 44% of individuals in Class 3 are perceived to treat
the counterpart impersonally and only 26% as a colleague. Moreover, for the negotiation counter-
parts it seems to be difficult to assess whether Americans try to explore, understand, and fulfill
the expectations of the other party during the negotiation process (48% say yes and 42% no) and
whether they incorporate mutual interests at the beginning of the negotiation (44% are not sure).
When asked directly to assess how the US counterparts understand the negotiation process, 54%
of the respondents perceive them as integrative and problem-solving, whereas 40% interpret them
as merely interested in distributing value.
The United States are ranked as the most individualistic country according to the Hofstede’s
framework and these ambiguous results can be a manifestation of this cultural trait. In fact,
Hofstede et al. (2012) state that negotiators from highly individualistic societies tend to conduct
the process having clear in mind their own personal interests (whatever those interests are),
whereas they might pose less emphasis on relationship building (Hofstede, 2001). This trait
could make the negotiating counterpart doubt whether his/her interests and perspectives are
indeed taken into consideration by the US negotiators.
In summary, our first cluster identified through LCA clearly represents distributive negotia-
tors, whereas the second and third clusters represent integrative negotiators (Table 4). The dis-
tributive negotiator is the classical type, who does not apply the negotiation principles
proposed by Fisher, Ury, and Patton (1981). This negotiator conceives negotiation as a zero–
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sum game and the counterpart as a rival to defeat, does not explore the interests of the other party
to make integrative, mutually beneficial offers, induces a process of bargaining and haggling
(instead of using objective criteria to distribute value), and uses emotions during the negotiation
process. The second cluster represents a new type of integrative negotiator found in Italy. This
negotiator seems to treat the counterpart as a colleague (rather than as a rival or impersonally),
explores interests before making a proposal for mutual benefits, is strongly oriented to mutual
value creation, expresses emotions, and uses objective criteria, even though he or she may end
up bargaining if the situation evolves in such a way. The third type of negotiator (mainly
American) also displays integrative behaviors, applying objective and technical criteria and avoid-
ing haggling, but is less oriented toward exploring the interests of the other side, is impersonal,
and avoids expressing emotions.
On the one hand, our analysis confirms that US individuals tend to take an integrative approach
to negotiation (e.g., Brett, Adair, Lempereur, Okumura, Shikhirev, and Tinsley, 1998). The
Table 4. Summary of research findings
Negotiation
principles
Class 1 Class 2 Class 3





Tend to treat the
negotiating
counterpart as a rival.
Tend to treat the negotiating
counterpart as a
colleague.
Tend to treat the negotiating
counterpart impersonally
or sometimes as a
colleague.
Tend to express emotions
during the negotiation
process.
Tend to express emotions
during the negotiation
process.









Tend to explore the interests











with respect to the focus
and insistence on the first
proposal during the
negotiation process.
Tend to integrate mutual
interests without too






First proposal tends to
include only individual
interests.
First proposal tends to
include mutual interests.
Unclear prevalent character
of first proposal in terms
of mutual or individual
interests’ inclusion.





Tend to understand the
objective of the
negotiation process as
create and distribute value
(integrative).


















Technical criteria tend to be
important during the
negotiation process.
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American culture is characterized by fairly low power distance and medium uncertainty avoidance
(Hofstede, 2001), high individualism and results orientation (Dorfman, Javidan, Hanges,
Dastmalchian, & House, 2012), and low-context communication and monochronicity (Hall,
1976), in spite of the efficiency of a multitask polychronic process (Brett et al., 1998). American
negotiators are said to feel relatively entitled to make proposals during the process, to be eager
to explore trade-offs and alternatives, and to avoid ‘leaving money on the table.’ Such behaviors
can help build options for mutual gains. However, our results also highlight some distributive fea-
tures of US negotiators, suggesting that US negotiation strategy requires more specific analysis.
On the other hand, the Italian culture scores in the middle zone in power distance and high in
uncertainty avoidance (Hofstede, 2001), suggesting a certain formality in negotiations, in both
role definition and detailed planning. High uncertainty avoidance is also related to the emotional
style of negotiation highlighted in the analysis for Italian individuals, regardless of the negotiation
strategy adopted. Italian society is also characterized by high masculinity (Hofstede, 2001), which
entails a certain propensity toward competition that manifests in distributive negotiation and is
necessary to obtain better economic results in the second stage of the integrative strategy.
Discussion
Our results confirm the general validity of the distributive/integrative negotiation framework
(Fisher et al., 1981; Walton & McKersie, 1965). It is in line with earlier and recent studies that
supported this theoretical model even for multicultural contexts (e.g., Graham, Mintu, &
Rodgers, 1994). Nevertheless, similar to previous researchers, we also find some peculiarities
related to different cultural backgrounds (Caputo et al., 2019a; Metcalf, Bird, Shankarmahesh,
Aycan, Larimo, & Valdelamar, 2006). In particular, we identify some nuances for the integrative
negotiation paradigm that seem to be related to cultural traits in the context of international
negotiations. This opens space for a better understanding of the complexities related to intercul-
tural negotiations, even for Western countries that are not considered so culturally distant, such
as the United States and Italy.
From the analysis, it clearly emerges that Italian people are in general very passionate and it is
culturally acceptable to express emotions; indeed, not doing so is considered dishonest or disin-
genuous, and the attempt to be detached is perceived as a form of deception. This cultural value
leads to an extensive use of varying voice tones and body language: Italians are used to high-
context communication (Hall, 1976).
Our finding of both types of negotiators in Italy aligns with the picture presented by Cominelli
and Lucchiari (2017) and Caputo and Valenza (2019), who identify a continuum that ranges from
‘Competing’ (a conflict management style that implies a win–lose perspective) to ‘Collaborating’
(a view of conflicts as problems to be solved jointly, which means searching for a win–win solution).
This divide in the Italian results on negotiation styles could mirror Italy’s strong cultural differen-
tiation between North and South (Clò, 2006) – a possibility that could be further examined by com-
paring data that include negotiators’ regional provenance (Kaasa, Vadi, & Varblane, 2014).
Our results further shed light on a substantive difference between Italian and American nego-
tiators. Indeed, one of our interviewees pointed out this feature straightforwardly: ‘The Italian is
undoubtedly a kind person to negotiate with, but absolutely different from the American type, for
example, which is faster, more practical in the negotiation. With them [Italians] there are a few
more steps … The negotiation and the challenge are a little more sentimental’ (Interview 17).
These results allow us to reject the hypothesis of homogeneity in negotiation strategies and styles
across different cultural clusters, even within Western culture.14
14Similar results, although with a stronger prevalence of the distributive prototype over the integrative one, were estab-
lished for a Latin American cluster (Ogliastri & Quintanilla, 2012), which shares some cultural similarities with the Latin
European one (Hofstede, 2001; Ogliastri et al., 1999).
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In addition, in what could be another management lesson from Italy, the main finding of our
analysis seems to yield a new ‘emotional integrative’ negotiator prototype, one that merges inte-
grative and emotional features. Posthuma (2012) posits that we need research on emotions – not
just cognitions and behaviors – to understand and facilitate effective negotiations, and the use of
emotions may be positive from a managerial perspective (Gunkel, Schlaegel, & Taras, 2016;
Kopelman & Rosette, 2008). In a meta-analysis, Sharma, Bottom, and Elfenbein find that indivi-
duals with strong emotional intelligence ‘achieve lower economic outcomes, but higher psycho-
logical subjective value’ (2013: 311). Emotional intelligence is an important social skill for life, but
it does not produce higher economic results for a negotiator unless both counterparts demon-
strate a certain ability to handle and identify emotions (Der Foo et al., 2004). The pending ques-
tion is the relative economic benefit of dealing with emotions in negotiations, especially
distinguishing between positive and negative ones (e.g., Luomala et al., 2015; Wong, 2020).
Recently, in discussing how to measure dignity, face, and honor cultures, Yao, Ramirez-Marin,
Brett, Aslani, and Semnani-Azad (2017) included the use of emotions in negotiations as an indi-
cator of distributive negotiation culture. Our results, however, imply that is not necessarily the
case, as the new type of Italian integrative negotiator makes all the moves to increase mutual
value (a key principle), but also handles emotions in a constructive way. These findings contribute
to the debate over whether Latin Europe is indeed a ‘dignity’ culture (Fosse, Ogliastri, & Rendon,
2017; Ogliastri, Rendón, & Fosse, 2017); our analysis suggests that Italy does not share negotiation
prototypes with the US dignity culture, and confirms Harinck, Shafa, Ellemers, and Beersma’s
(2013) finding that cooperative negotiation behaviors exist in honor cultures. However, our data-
set does not include key details, so this remains an interesting topic for future research.
Furthermore, it is still necessary to ascertain the specific behaviors of this ‘emotional integrative’
negotiator prototype, as well as the outcomes the negotiator gets from the negotiation process and
the relative effects of different types of emotions (Wong, 2020). This negotiator should also be dis-
tinguished from the ‘soft’ distributive negotiator prototype described by Fischer, Ury and Patton
(1981). Students often confuse the soft negotiator with the integrative one, but their strategies
are different: the soft negotiator is likeable, shows concern for the needs of the counterpart, and
is willing to make sacrifices in order to get to a quick agreement, but he or she does not believe
that it is possible to increase value and conceives negotiation as a distributive zero–sum game. It
is crucial to find out whether the distinctive Italian ‘emotional integrative’ negotiation strategy
leads to better outcomes: even though this prototype is clearly different from the soft one, is it com-
petitive enough to succeed at getting a large piece of the jointly increased value?
More research is also needed to compare and contrast this new ‘emotional integrative’ nego-
tiation prototype with the ‘impersonal integrative’ one (Harinck et al., 2013). Indeed, as a further
development of this study, it would be of great interest to extend the analysis, first by including
more countries of the Latin Europe and Anglo cultural clusters, and second by broadening the
database to all the relevant cultural clusters validated by Gupta, Hanges, and Dorfman (2002).
An enlarged study would surely lead to more robust results, allow for wider cross-cultural com-
parison, and support a deeper understanding of the key cultural features that bring about differ-
ent attitudes, strategies, reactions, and final outcomes during the negotiation process. Moreover, it
would be of great interest to incorporate interactions of negotiators from specific cultural back-
grounds to study the effects on the outcomes (Cai, Wilson, & Drake, 2000; Fosse, Ogliastri, &
Rendon, 2017). Starting from our findings, these extensions could give managers in multicultural
environments a more comprehensive map of the complex world of cross-cultural negotiation and
maximize the chances to reach agreements for joint gains.
Conclusion
The contributions of this study are manyfold. First, we have contributed to the cross-cultural
negotiation and international management literature by complementing the global picture of
16 Sara Benetti et al.
https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/jmo.2020.47
Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. IP address: 149.86.69.228, on 05 Jul 2021 at 13:40:06, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at
cross-cultural negotiation differences by introducing one of the first analysis of Italian negotia-
tors. Second, we have contributed to the cross-cultural negotiation literature by deepening our
understanding of the role of culture in the selection of a negotiation strategy, as our results clearly
shows how negotiators from Italy and the USA tends to choose a different style. Such results gave
also light to a third, and probably most important, contribution to the field of study of cross-
cultural negotiation, by unveiling a third negotiation prototype that we called ‘emotional integra-
tive.’ Our findings are relevant as they seem to give insight into a multifaceted nature of the
original distributive versus integrative framework, where the differential importance given to
emotions in certain cultures (such as the Italian vs. the American) allows for a development of
a specific, nontypical, negotiation prototype, especially among integrative negotiators. This result
is in line with a trend to understand relationality in cross-cultural negotiations (Cheng, Huang, &
Su, 2017; Graham, 2019; Usunier, 2018).
Even though the results and contributions of this study are interesting and, in parts, counter-
intuitive, a number of limitations requiring future research are present. First, our results are
drawn by the accounts of past experiences of negotiating with Italian and American negotiators,
and as such are unavoidably subject to perceptions and the bias of recall (Fischhoff & Beyth,
1975). Furthermore, qualitative data collections and analyses are intrinsically affected by subject-
ivity, which we tried to limit by having a cross-cultural approach and adopting a diverse and large
pool of informants and interviewers (Fosse, Ogliastri, & Rendon, 2017). These issues are very
common in negotiation research (Lewicki, Saunders, & Barry, 2020), and we call for future studies
to continue in methodological advancements that allow for better proxies of real negotiations.
Second, our study focused on comparing only two countries (USA and Italy) and did not inves-
tigate how the negotiators’ prototypes would relate to each other. Future research could address
this gap by extending our research in investigating the interaction dynamics of the identified pro-
totypes, as well as looking at more countries and cultures. Finally, similarly to Fosse, Ogliastri,
and Rendon (2017) we should be careful in labeling the typical ‘Italian’ or ‘American’ as both
countries have had demographic and social changes over the years that have shaped culture
and negotiation style. Future research avenues could focus on a truer account of cultural diversity,
for example by looking directly at individual cultural values (Caputo et al., 2019a).
Our contributions are also of practical and managerial relevance (summarized in Table 4). Our
findings suggest that managers and negotiators interacting with Italian negotiators need to pay
particular attention to the role played by emotions when aiming to achieve integrative agree-
ments. Similarly, when negotiating with American negotiators, to achieve integrative agreements
the focus seems to be more toward the impersonal and technical considerations of the negoti-
ation. Finally, according to our results, training is implicated. Negotiators and managers who
would like to successfully bridge across cultures and within global environments will benefit
from training that is culturally focused. Indeed, training negotiators almost exclusively on
American-based content, may displace efforts to successfully reach integrative agreements with
other cultures, as the Italian experiences have shown. Conflict management and negotiation train-
ing packages should not only train negotiation skills, but also emotional and cultural competen-
cies to effectively negotiate.
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Appendix 1: Hofstede’s cultural dimensions: Italy versus United States
Hofstede’s cultural dimensions
Italy United States
Indexa Rank (/63)b,c Index Rank (/63)
Power distance 50 41 40 48
Individualism 76 8 91 1
Masculinity 70 7 62 16
Uncertainty avoidance 75 28 46 52
Long-term orientation 61 20 26 52
aA higher value of the index indicates that the characteristic under study is more prominent.
bRanking positions are calculated from the ‘dimension data matrix’ (https://geerthofstede.com/research-and-vsm/dimension-data-matrix/),
considering only the 63 countries for which all five indices are available (power distance, uncertainty avoidance, individualism vs.
collectivism, masculinity vs. femininity, and long- vs. short-term orientation).
cThe ranking goes from 1 to 63, with 1 indicating the stronger characterization of the cultural trait under study (higher index) and 63
indicating the weaker characterization of the cultural trait (lower index).
Appendix 2: Intercultural negotiation: Questions about 20 topics
(1) Negotiation culture: Summing up: how do they negotiate?
(2) Perception of the other party: Do they conceive the counterpart as a friend, a colleague,
a rival, or neutrally impersonal?
(3) Time perspective: Are they long-term or short-term oriented?
(4) Trust base: Is trust based on the person, on the legal system and the written contract, or
on previous experience?
(5) Risk taking: Do they take risks of not delivering commitments?
(6) Who are the negotiators: What criteria do they use to select negotiators?
(7) Decision making: How do they decide and who makes decisions?
(8) Formality: Are they informal/formal, do they follow a protocol, how close is interper-
sonal treatment?
(9) Informal negotiations: Do they use out-of-the-office negotiations?
(10) Prenegotiations (and negotiation preparation): Do they have previous meetings? Do
they come prepared?
(11) Opening: Do they open with extreme offers, use objective criteria to justify offers,
haggling?
(12) Arguments: Do they use persuasion, emotionally moving language, hard data, threats,
rational debate?
(13) Emotionality: Do they induce a rational or emotional process, expressive or instrumen-
tal use of feelings?
(14) Power tactics: Threats, intimidation, fake lack of interest, aggressiveness, confrontation?
(15) Discussion level: Do they discuss details or generalities?
(16) Time during negotiation: Are they punctual, polychronic, slow, agenda focused?
(17) Type of agreement: Oral, in writing, legal, official agreements?
(18) Commitment and fulfillment: Are agreements binding?
(19) Perception flexibility: Are they rigid or flexible about changes?
(20) Ways of expression: Interpersonally friendly, courteous, confrontational, diplomatic,
imposing, evasive, neutral?
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Appendix 3: Sample of the codebook
(1) Emotionality: Do they induce a rational or emotional process, expressive or instrumental
use of feelings?
Questions: How much room is left for expressing emotions during the negotiation, or is
it a neutral and objective process? Is there room for personal expression needs or is it an
instrumental technique meant to influence the other party? Are hostility and affection
displayed by only one of the parties or by neither of the two?
Codebook:
Do they express emotions in negotiations?
___Yes (emotional)
___No (neutral, objective, rational, formality)
___Not sure, no information, I don’t know
Expressive nature of feelings expressed in negotiations?
___Yes (ventilating feelings is acceptable for them, expressive culture)
___No (it is not accepted, not considered professional or mature)
___Not sure, no information, I don’t know
Instrumental nature of feelings expressed in negotiations?
___Yes (feelings are a tool to impress, a negotiation tactic, impact oriented)
___No (they are not used, or considered hypocrisy and bad manners)
___Not sure, no information, I don’t know
Do they express hostility as a normal feeling during negotiations?
___Yes (it is considered normal to express some hostility)
___No (it is not acceptable)
___Not sure, no information, I don’t know
Do they express affection during negotiations?
___Yes (it is acceptable and normal)
___No (it is not common, not customary)
___Not sure, no information, I don’t know
Appendix 4: Formal international negotiation questionnaire
(1) Specifically, think of one concrete formal negotiation in which you participated and
which involved people or entities from two countries.
(2) What were the previous issues (interests) leading up to this negotiation? What
would have happened to each party if no agreement was reached; what were their
alternatives?
(3) How did you and they prepare for this negotiation? What were the prenegotiations?
How did they approach you?
(4) How did they decide who was going to negotiate, what would be on the agenda, where
the negotiation would take place?
(5) How did the negotiation begin? (Was it a haggling/bargaining process with an exces-
sive opening demand?) Who opened the negotiation? How did each of the parties go
about their openings? Were objective criteria sought or established or was it a mere
bargaining of positions?
(6) What were the main incidents in the transaction? How did you get the most important
points?
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(7) How was the closure of the deal? Was it a satisfactory to both parties?
(8) What drew your attention the most in this experience? What did you like most? What
did you like least? Do you think people from the other country are similar or dissimilar
to you? What are they like?
(9) Do you think this was a typical experience? Have you had experiences with people
from the same country or culture that differ much from this one?
(10) What advice would you give someone going to this country to negotiate?
(11) In brief, how do people from this country usually negotiate? What is the difference
found in the negotiation you just recounted?
(12) If you had to do this negotiation again, would you change your behavior? What would
you do in a different way and why?
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